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The Ethics of the Mohist “Dialogues” 
Chris Fraser 
 
Introduction 
The Mohist “Dialogues” are four books of the Mozi (Books 46–49) comprising brief 
conversations between Mozi and various disciples, opponents, and rulers or officials. The 
first two of the books also present sayings attributed to Mozi.1 The Dialogues reflect the 
Mohists at the height of their influence as a sociopolitical reform movement. They depict 
Mozi 墨子 traveling to various states and receiving audiences with their rulers, to whom he 
dispenses moral and political advice. He discusses doctrinal issues with students and 
                                                
1 The content of the four books can be summarized very roughly as follows: Book 46, “Geng 
Zhu,” is a mixed collection of anecdotes, conversations, and sayings touching on a variety of 
themes in Mohist thought. (The book is named after Geng Zhuzi 耕柱子, a Mohist disciple 
who appears in its opening anecdote.) Book 47, “Gui Yi 貴義 (Valuing Morality),” focuses 
loosely on moral psychology and moral instruction and comprises mainly sayings ascribed to 
Mozi. Book 48, “Gong Meng,” mainly presents Mohist criticisms of the Ru. (The book takes 
its title from Gong Mengzi 公孟子, a Ru depicted in several conversations with Mozi.) Book 
49, “Lu Wen 魯問 (Questions of Lu),” relates conversations tied in various ways to the state 
of Lu, including several between Mozi and the ruler of Lu. Aside from these general themes, 
however, books 47, 48, and 49 all contain other miscellaneous material as well. On the 
whole, the Dialogues are organized only very loosely, although their content is doctrinally 
fairly coherent. A fifth book, Book 50, Gong Shu 公輸, is sometimes also counted among 
the Dialogues. This book contains a single, extended anecdote about Mozi convincing the 
King of Chu 楚 to call off an attack on Song 宋 by explaining how his defense tactics 
could counter all nine means of attack invented by Gongshu Pan 公輸盤, a brilliant military 
engineer employed by Chu. Since, unlike books 46–49, this book is not a collection of short 
passages treating doctrinal issues, for the purposes of this paper I will not treat it as part of 
the Dialogues.  
2 
outsiders, including several Ru 儒 (Confucians, “erudites”), an opponent named Wumazi 巫
馬子,2 who defends an ethic of self-interest, and a critic named Wu Lü 吳慮, who opposes 
moral activism, advocating instead self-sufficient living off the land.3 The Mohist “school” is 
depicted as a flourishing, disciplined organization that attracts and trains students, 
recommends them for official posts or dispatches them on military assignments, and is 
supported by donations from them once they are employed. It is difficult to say to what extent 
the sayings and events these texts associate with Mozi are grounded in historical fact and to 
what extent they are retrospective embellishments, projections backward from the status and 
doctrines of later generations of Mohists. The doctrines and prose style of the Dialogues are 
more polished than those of the earliest Mohist essays, such as Mozi Books 11, 14, and 17, 
which may record the words of Mo Di himself. Unlike the essays in the the “Triads” — the 
ten sets of three essay-length “books,” or pian 篇, that form the core of the Mozi (books 8–
37)4 — one passage in the Dialogues explicitly arranges the ten core Mohist doctrines into a 
                                                
2 Commentators such as Su Shi Xue 蘇時學 have suggested that Wuma was a Ru, either a 
student of Confucius named Wuma Qi 巫馬期 or his son (Wu 1993, 647). However, in the 
Dialogues, Wuma is not treated as a representative of the Ru (as, for instance, Gong Mengzi 
公孟子 is), and he expresses no distinctively Ru views. Moreover, he criticizes the practice, 
shared by both the Mohists and the Ru, of praising the “former kings” as moral exemplars (46: 
101/1–10). These points suggest he was probably not a Ru. 
3 Outwardly, Wu Lü’s dao (49: 113/13–29), resembles that of the “Agriculturalists,” a 
movement devoted to economic self-sufficiency (see Graham 1989, 64–74). He may not be 
aligned with them, however, since instead of mentioning their patron god the Divine Farmer 
(Shen Nong 神農), he claims to emulate the sage-king Shun 舜. His position overlaps some 
Daoist views, since he advocates a simple lifestyle and opposes the dissemination of explicit 
moral teachings.  
4 Four of the ten triads are incomplete, as seven of these thirty books are lost. The core books 
are sometimes also considered to include a pair of texts entitled “Condemning the Ru” (Fei 
3 
systematic, coherent platform addressing a range of social and political problems, one or 
another of which Mohist teachers are to select for initial presentation to a ruler on the basis of 
the particular problems his state faces (see below). This discussion implies a context in which 
not only Mozi but his senior disciples have sufficient reputation and social status that they 
routinely succeed in approaching rulers from “the four quarters” — all parts of the early 
Chinese world — to offer policy advice. Given the Mohists’ plebeian origins, it seems 
unlikely that they could have achieved this level of influence within Mozi’s lifetime. So I 
tentatively suggest that the Dialogues represent the status and doctrines of the movement 
some time after — perhaps several generations after — Mozi’s death.5 Some of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Ru 非儒), one of which is lost. The surviving member of the pair is devoted entirely to 
criticizing the Ru; its first half resembles a debate handbook recording stock rebuttals of Ru 
teachings. Since, unlike the Triad essays, this text is not organized as a coherent presentation 
of a specific Mohist doctrine, I place it in a separate category from the Triads.  
5 A pair of correspondences between the Dialogues and the Confucian Analects offer 
intriguing hints but no conclusive information as to the Dialogues’ chronology. A passage at 
(46: 101/20–21) appears to cite the exchange in Analects 13:16 between Confucius and 
Zigao, Duke of She 葉公子高, concerning good government — “the nearby are pleased, and 
the distant come” — and criticizes it for offering no concrete policy proposals. Another 
passage at (48: 108/26–28) ridicules the defense of the Ruist three-year mourning ritual in 
Analects 17:19. (The Analects explains that the three-year mourning ritual reciprocates the 
three years of care infants receive from their parents; the Mohist reply is that the Ru 
apparently know no better than an infant how to conduct themselves.) These parallels seem to 
place the Dialogues in the same intellectual milieu as the second, later half of the Analects. 
(See too Brooks and Brooks [1998, 259–62], who explore a more extensive series of potential 
parallels, some relatively speculative.) In particular, since Analects 17:19 probably falls 
within the very late strata of that text, one might appeal to it to assign a similarly late date to 
the corresponding Mozi passage. (The Brookses [1998, 161] propose a date of ca. 270 BCE 
for Analects 17:19.) However, the absolute dates of the Analects passages are difficult to 
determine, and rather than the Mozi passage on the three-year mourning responding directly 
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conversations they record might go back to Mozi himself, but we probably have no way of 
determining to what extent they do. 
This essay will argue that the ethics of the Dialogues is largely consistent with that of 
the middle and late books of the Triads,6 but that the Dialogues develop characteristic 
Mohist ethical ideas in several interesting ways. First, they clarify the Mohist conception of 
yi 義 (morality, duty, right) as norms that can be explicitly expressed in yan 言 
(statements) and publicized and consistently followed by all with good consequences. 
Second, they present a series of views on moral worth that tie it to agents’ character and 
intentions. Third, they fill out the Mohist view of moral motivation and suggest how the 
Mohists might approach issues related to weakness of will. Finally, they present a new, 
demanding ideal of moral sagehood. The following sections explore the continuity between 
the Triads and the Dialogues and then consider each of these four developments in turn. 
Continuity with the Triads 
The ethical doctrines of the Dialogues are in many respects continuous with doctrines 
found in the Triads, particularly the later strata.7 As in most of the Triad essays, the standard 
of right teachings and action is what benefits Heaven (Tian 天), the ghosts, and the common 
people: 
子墨子曰：「凡言凡動，利於天鬼百姓者為之。凡言凡動，害於天鬼百姓者舍
之。凡言凡動，合於三代聖王堯舜禹湯文武者為之，凡言凡動，合於三代暴王
桀紂幽厲者舍之。」 
Our master Mozi said, “In all statements and actions, do what is beneficial to Heaven, 
ghosts, and the common people. In all statements and actions, renounce what is 
                                                                                                                                                  
to the text of the Analects, conceivably both might reflect a pre-existing, widely circulated Ru 
saying. 
6 The twenty-three surviving essays in the Triads fall into several chronological strata. For an 
overview, see the supplement on “Texts and Authorship” in Fraser (2002).  
7 For an overview of the ethics of the Triads, see Fraser (2002), sect. 7.  
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harmful to Heaven, ghosts, and the common people. In all statements and actions, do 
what conforms to the sage-kings of the three dynasties, Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, 
and Wu. In all statements and action, renounce what conforms to the tyrants of the 
three dynasties, Jie, Zhou, You, and Li.” (47: 104/15–17) 
As this passage shows, the Dialogues also follow the middle and later Triad essays in 
commending the sage-kings as moral exemplars or models by which to distinguish what is 
right.8 Other passages further extol the value of the sage-kings’ teachings: 
巫馬子謂子墨子曰：「舍今之人而譽先王，是譽槁骨也。譬若匠人然，智槁木
也，而不智生木。」子墨子曰：「天下之所以生者，以先王之道教也。今譽先
王，是譽天下之所以生也。…」 
Wumazi said to Mozi, “To set aside people of today and instead praise the former 
kings, this is to praise rotten bones. It’s like a carpenter who knows rotten wood but 
not living wood.” Our master Mozi said, “That by which the world lives is through 
the teachings of the dao (way) of the former kings. Now praising the former kings, 
this is praising that by which the world lives.” (46: 101/9–11) 
子墨子曰：「古之聖王欲傳其道於後世，是故書之竹帛，鏤之金石，傳遺後世
子孫，欲後世子孫法之也。今聞先王之遺而不為，是廢先王之傳也。」 
Our master Mozi said, “The ancient sage-kings desired to pass their dao on to later 
generations. So they wrote it on bamboo and silk and engraved it on metal and stone 
in order to pass it down to their descendants, desiring that their descendants would 
emulate it. Now to hear what was passed down from the former kings but not practice 
it, this is to discard the traditions of the former kings.” (47: 105/16–17) 
As in most of the Triads, benefit (li 利) — the criterion of what is morally right — is 
understood to comprise wealth, population, and social order (zhi 治). Where the Triads 
typically include state security within the scope of social order, a passage in the Dialogues 
treats it as a separate item.   
子墨子曰：「和氏之璧，隋侯之珠，三棘六異，此諸侯之所謂良寶也。可以富
國家，眾人民，治刑政，安社稷乎？…今用義為政於國家，人民必眾，刑政必
治，社稷必安。所為貴良寶者，可以利民也，而義可以利人。故曰：義，天下
之良寶也。」 
Our master Mozi said, “The jade of He, the pearl of Sui, and the nine caldrons — 
these are what the various lords call “precious.” Can they enrich the state, increase the 
population, bring order to the government, and bring security to the state? . . . Now if 
                                                
8 On the role of the sage-kings, see Miranda Brown in this volume. 
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one governs a state by employing yi (morality), the population will surely be large, 
the government will surely be orderly, and the state will surely be secure. The reason 
we value precious things is that they can benefit people, and yi can benefit people. So 
I say, yi is the most precious thing in the world.” (46: 101/14–18) 
Consistent with many of the Triads, a person with moral wisdom or know-how obeys 
Heaven, sacrifices to the ancestral ghosts and nature-spirits, cares about others, and 
moderates expenditures: 
子墨子曰：「夫知者必尊天事鬼，愛人節用，合焉為知矣。」 
Our master Mozi said, “A wise person must respect Heaven, serve ghosts, care about 
others, and moderate expenses. Combining these constitutes wisdom.” (48: 107/27) 
Like many of the triad essays, the Dialogues oppose wars of aggression, profligate 
spending, extravagant burial and mourning practices, luxurious entertainment, and fatalism. 
Several exchanges with rulers of different states depict Mozi condemning military 
aggression, as in the following:  
子墨子謂魯陽文君曰：「攻其鄰國，殺其民人，取其牛馬粟米貨財，則書之於
竹帛，鏤之於金石，以為銘於鐘鼎，傅遺後世子孫曰：莫若我多。今賤人也，
亦攻其鄰家，殺其人民，取其狗豕食糧衣裘，亦書之竹帛，以為銘於席豆，以
遺後世子孫曰：莫若我多。亓可乎？」魯陽文君曰：「然吾以子之言觀之，則
天下之所謂可者，未必然也。」 
Our master Mozi said to Lord Wen of Luyang, “[Warlike rulers such as yourself] 
attack neighboring states, kill their people, seize their oxen and horses, food, and 
goods, and then write their deeds on bamboo and silk, engrave them on metal and 
stone, and inscribe them on bells and cauldrons to pass on to their descendants, 
saying, ‘No one’s achievements equal mine.’ Now suppose a commoner were 
similarly to attack neighboring families, kill their people, seize their dogs and pigs, 
food, and clothing, and similarly write his deeds on bamboo and silk and inscribe 
them on vessels and dishes to pass on to his descendants, saying, ‘No one’s 
achievements equal mine.’ How could this be permissible?” Lord Wen of Luyang 
said, “So if I view it on the basis of your statement, what all the world calls 
permissible is not necessarily so.” (49: 112/14–18) 
This passage is also significant because it emphasizes the distinction, introduced in the 
“Moderation in Burial” essay in the Triads (25: 41/18–27), between prevailing customs and 
objective moral norms: what “all the world” considers permissible might nevertheless be 
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morally wrong. Another passage has Mozi castigating a minister of Wei 衛, a small state 
surrounded by wealthier, more powerful rivals, for spending resources on luxuries and a 
harem rather than defense, which would be of greater benefit: 
今簡子之家，飾車數百乘，馬食菽粟者數百匹，婦人衣文繡者數百人，吾取飾
車食馬之費，與鏽衣之財以畜士，必千人有餘。若有患難，則使百人處於前，
數百於後，與婦人數百人處前後，孰安？ 
Now if we examine your house, there are hundreds of decorated vehicles, hundreds of 
grain-fed horses, and hundreds of women clothed in finery. If we took the cost of 
decorating the vehicles and feeding the horses and the materials needed for the fine 
clothing and used them to maintain soldiers, surely they would exceed a thousand 
men. If there were a crisis, you could station several hundred in the front and several 
hundred in the rear. Compared with stationing several hundred women in the front 
and rear, which would be more secure? (47: 105/26–28) 
The Triad essays on fatalism, economic moderation, and music phrase their condemnation of 
fatalistic beliefs, excessive funeral practices, and wasteful entertainment generally, directing 
them at what are depicted as widespread views and customs the Mohists see as detrimental to 
the general welfare. By contrast, the Dialogues incorporate these points — along with a 
criticism of their supposed impiety — into an attack targeted specifically against the Ru: 
儒之道足以喪天下者，四政焉。儒以天為不明，以鬼為不神，天鬼不說。… 又
厚葬久喪，重為棺槨，多為衣衾，送死若徙，三年哭泣，扶後起，杖後行，耳
無聞，目無見。…又弦歌鼓舞，習為聲樂。…又以命為有，貧富壽夭，治亂安
危有極矣，不可損益也。為上者行之，必不聽治矣，為下者行之，必不從事
矣。 
The dao (way) of the Ru includes four policies that are each enough to ruin the world. 
The Ru treat Heaven as insentient and the ghosts as inanimate, [and so] Heaven and 
the ghosts are displeased. . . . They also conduct rich burials and prolonged mourning. 
They have several inner and outer coffins and many layers of shrouds, and their 
funeral processions are like moving house. For three years they cry and weep, until 
they cannot stand up without support or walk without a cane, their ears unable to hear 
and their eyes unable to see. . . . They also sing to the accompaniment of strings and 
dance to drums, practicing songs and music. . . . And they take fate to exist, holding 
that poverty or wealth, longevity or early death, social order or disorder, security or 
danger have fixed limits and cannot be increased or decreased. If rulers practice this, 
they will surely neglect to govern; if their subjects practice it, they will surely neglect 
their work. (48: 109/4–8) 
The subtext of these criticisms is that the dao of the Ru fails to promote the benefit of all and 
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is thus morally wrong. Ru practices displease Heaven and the spirits, waste resources, and 
interfere with economic production and good social order.9 
An interesting difference between the Dialogues and the Triads, then, is the 
emergence of the Ru as rivals whose doctrines and practices the Mohists explicitly denounce, 
often in face-to-face discussions with individual Ru. Many essays in the middle and later 
chronological strata of the Triads condemn practices such as rich burials or elaborate musical 
performances and rebut criticisms of Mohist doctrines, but without identifying particular 
opponents or rival groups by name.10 By contrast, the Dialogues confront opponents such as 
Wumazi and Wu Lü and direct a series of scathing criticisms at the Ru.11 One explanation 
for this difference may simply be the different genres or purposes of the two sets of texts. The 
Triads focus on promulgating and defending Mohist doctrines, not refuting rivals. Where 
they attack harmful practices or answer criticisms, their purpose is not to diminish particular 
opponents so much as to justify the Mohist dao. By contrast, the Dialogues have broader 
aims and a more diffuse focus. Besides promoting Mohist doctrines, they depict exchanges in 
which Mozi debates and criticizes opponents, answers disciples’ questions, provides moral 
coaching or other practical advice, and offers various observations or words of wisdom. 
                                                
9 Besides the points in the quoted passage, the Dialogues also criticize the Ru for their 
excessive conservatism (46: 102/19–2, 48: 107/20–23) and their passivity (48: 106:25–31, 48: 
107/5–9), two attitudes that in the Mohists’ view squander opportunities to benefit the world.  
10 The “Fei Ru” chapter attacks the Ru by name, but, as explained in footnote 4, I believe we 
should classify this text separately from the Triads. Although its chronological relationship to 
the Triad essays is not entirely clear, stylistic and thematic features suggest it is of later origin 
than the early and middle strata, and its content has more affinities with the Dialogues. A 
detailed discussion of “Fei Ru” is beyond the scope of this paper, however.  
11 Among the individual Ru mentioned in the Dialogues are Confucius, an unnamed follower 
of Confucius’s student Zixia 子夏 (46: 101/5), Gong Mengzi (book 48, passim), and 
Chengzi 程子 (48: 109/4). 
9 
Another explanation for the greater prominence of the Ru in the Dialogues may be that when 
most of the Triad essays were composed, the Ru did not strike the Mohists as especially 
significant rivals.12 The Ru movement may have developed in parallel with Mohism, such 
that the Ru became prominent adversaries for the Mohists only after the bulk of the Triads 
were produced.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Dialogues explicitly organize the ten core 
Mohist teachings into a platform comprising five pairs of doctrines targeted at a range of 
social problems: 
子墨子游魏越，曰：「既得見四方之君子則將先語？」子墨子曰：「凡入國，
必擇務而從事焉。國家昏亂，則語之尚賢尚同，國家貧，則語之節用節葬，國
家說音湛湎，則語之非樂非命，國家淫辟無禮，則語之尊天事鬼，國家務奪侵
凌，則語之兼愛非攻，故曰擇務而從事焉。」 
Our master Mozi visited Wei Yue, who said: “Having been granted an audience with 
the rulers of the four quarters, what would you expound first?” Our master Mozi said, 
“Whenever you enter a state, you must select a task and work on it. If the state is in 
disorder, expound ‘promoting the worthy’ and ‘identifying upward’; if the state is 
impoverished, expound ‘moderation in use’ and ‘moderation in burial’; if the state 
overindulges in musical entertainment, expound ‘condemning music’ and 
‘condemning fatalism’; if the state is dissolute and indecorous, expound ‘respecting 
Heaven’ and ‘serving ghosts’; if the state is devoted to aggression and intimidation, 
expound ‘inclusive care’ and ‘condemning aggression’. So I say, select a task and 
work on it.”13 (49: 114/7–10) 
This passage underscores the consistency between the Dialogues and the Triads. It suggests 
that the writers of at least some parts of the Dialogues were consciously concerned to provide 
clear, concise reformulations of key doctrines from the Triads, along with guidance for 
Mohist adherents in applying them. 
Let me now move beyond these points of continuity to explore developments in the 
ethics of the Dialogues. 
                                                
12 For a detailed discussion of the identity of the early Mohists’ opponents and the 
significance of the Ru for the Mohists, see Robins (2008). 
13 For a summary of the ten doctrines, see Fraser (2002), sect. 2. 
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Role of Yan 言 
A cornerstone of Mohist ethics is the conviction that the proper moral and political 
dao 道 (way) can be expressed and transmitted explicitly in verbal formulations as yan 言 
(statements, doctrines, teachings). Such yan are treated as dicta or instructions that guide 
action. Like many early Chinese texts, the Mozi frequently pairs yan conceptually with xing 
行 (conduct, practice).14 People’s conduct is expected to correspond to their yan, and those 
who endorse contrasting yan can be expected to act in contrasting ways (e.g., 16: 28/4–5).15 
As illustrated in the Mohist doctrine of “identifying upward” (shang tong 尚同), people are 
expected to follow their rulers’ yan (11: 16/19–23), and moral education involves emulating 
the yan and xing — in effect, the words and deeds — of worthy political leaders. A major 
aim of the Triads is to present the yan of Mozi, which the texts propose as a guide to right 
conduct. Opponents’ objections to Mohist doctrines are characterized as yan (e.g., 16: 27/28, 
25: 40/28), as are views the Mohists seek to refute concerning funerals, the non-existence of 
                                                
14 In various contexts, the pairing yan and xing may correspond roughly to the English “word 
and deed,” “theory and practice,” or “principle and application.” 
15 Of course, people sometimes endorse yan that they fail to carry out completely, as the 
Mohists complain concerning officials’ failure to practice their doctrine of “promoting the 
worthy”: “Now the officer gentlemen of the world in their personal lives and statements all 
promote the worthy. But when it comes to public administration and ruling the people, none 
know to promote the worthy and employ the capable. Thus we know that the officer 
gentleman of the world understand minor things but not major ones” (10: 14/6–7). As the 
Mohists see it, officials know enough to practice the doctrine in minor, personal matters, as 
when they insist on hiring an expert butcher to cut up an ox or tailor make a suit of clothes, 
but not in major affairs such as selecting appointees for government office, when they instead 
practice nepotism or favoritism. Such cases are an example of partial incompetence in 
following yan or the dao. Notice that the criticism is that officials do not “know” (zhi 知) to 
employ the capable in government. I discuss the Mohists’ views on such partial 
incompetence further below. 
11 
ghosts, and the existence of fate (e.g., 25: 38/26–39/6, 31: 55/7, 35: 58/15–16). The Mohists 
specifically identify the pernicious yan of the fatalists as a cause of poverty, inadequate 
population, and social disorder, since applying this yan to guide conduct leads to 
economically and politically harmful negligence (35: 60/7–10): 
子墨子言曰:「古者王公大人，為政國家者，皆欲國家之富，人民之眾，刑政之
治。然而不得富而得貧，不得眾而得寡，不得治而得亂，則是本失其所欲，得
其所惡，是故何也？」子墨子言曰：「執有命者以雜於民閒者眾。」執有命者
之言曰：「命富則富，命貧則貧，命眾則眾，命寡則寡，命治則治，命亂則
亂，命壽則壽，命夭則夭。命雖強勁何益哉？」上以說王公大人，下以駔百姓
之從事。故執有命者不仁。故當執有命者之言，不可不明辨。 
Our master Mozi stated (yan), “Ancient kings, dukes, and grandees in governing the 
state all desired that their state be wealthy, their population large, and their 
government orderly. However, they obtained not wealth but poverty, not a large 
population but a small one, not order but disorder. This is failing to get what they 
originally desired and instead getting what they detested. What is the reason for this?” 
Our master Mozi stated, “There were many fatalists mixed in among the people.” The 
yan (statement) of the fatalists says, “If fated to be wealthy, then wealthy; if fated to 
be poor, then poor. If fated to be many, then many; if fated to be few, then few. If 
fated to be orderly, then orderly; if fated to be disorderly, then disorderly. If fated to 
be long-lived, then a long life; if fated to be short-lived, than a short life. Given fate, 
even if one devotes great effort, of what advantage is it?” Above, they persuaded 
kings, dukes, and grandees of this, below they interfered in the work of the common 
people with it. So the fatalists are morally bad. So as to the yan (statements) of the 
fatalists, we cannot fail to clearly distinguish them.16 (35: 58/13–18) 
The link between yan and conduct is what makes promulgating incorrect yan not merely 
intellectually misguided, but morally despicable. Since people tend to act on yan, the Mohists 
deem it crucial to establish explicit, reliable criteria for evaluating “the distinctions between 
shi 是 (this/right) and fei 非 (not/wrong) and between benefit and harm” with respect to 
yan (35: 58/19–20). The major criteria they propose are their “three models” (san fa 三法): 
yan should be “rooted” (ben 本) in or “tested” (kao 考) against the deeds of the ancient 
sage-kings (that is, they should have some historical precedent); they should have a “source” 
in what the common people can hear and see (they should have some empirical basis); and 
                                                
16 That is, we should apply objective models or criteria to “clearly distinguish” whether they 
are shi 是 (right) or fei 非 (wrong). 
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they should be successful in “application” (yong 用) — specifically, when applied as a basis 
for government administration and penal law, they should benefit the state, clan, and 
common people (35: 58/19–22).17 
The Dialogues underscore and develop this conception of correct yan as an expression 
of and guide to dao. Yan that are effective in guiding or improving conduct are to be made 
regular or “constant” (chang 常) — that is, repeated frequently and promulgated widely 
(and, presumably, followed consistently). Regularly uttering yan that are of no use in guiding 
conduct is “verbal depravity” (dang kou 蕩口): 
言足以復行者，常之，不足以舉行者，勿常。不足以舉行而常之，是蕩口也。 
Yan adequate to repeatedly guide conduct (xing), make them constant (repeat them 
regularly); those not adequate to guide conduct, do not make them constant. To make 
constant those not adequate to guide conduct is verbal depravity. (46: 101/30–31)18 
In another important passage (46: 102/24–103/1), Mozi accuses Wumazi of “verbal 
depravity” because his yan is of “no benefit.” Benefit (li 利), of course, is the third of the 
three models for distinguishing yan that are shi from those that are fei.19 The yan in question 
is apparently Wuma’s slogan that “For me there is killing others to benefit myself, but not 
killing myself to benefit others” (我有殺彼以利我，無殺我以利彼), which Mozi refers to 
as “your yi” (子之義) and Wuma himself calls “my yi” (我義) (my norm or standard of 
right). The passage thus implies that such yan articulate conceptions or aspects of yi, here 
probably referring to norms governing what is right or morally correct. It also implies a 
                                                
17 One version of the theory refers to the three models as the three “markers” (biao 表) (35: 
58/19). Another substitutes “documents of the former kings” for what people hear and see as 
the “source” and adds “the intent of Heaven and ghosts” as part of the “root” (36: 60/19–20). 
18 A nearly identical statement also appears at (47: 104/19–20). 
19 Strictly speaking, the third model is that a yan applied as a basis for government 
administration and penal law should benefit the state, clan, and people. 
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conceptual link between the notion of yi and the Mohist view that appropriate yan should be 
made “constant” (chang 常, 46: 101/30). Mozi refutes Wumazi’s yi by showing how 
publicizing it would have self-defeating consequences: those who endorse it would be 
inclined to kill Wuma to benefit themselves, while those who reject it would be inclined to 
kill him to stop the spread of his malicious yan. Either way, although his proposed yi (norm) 
aims to protect or promote his interests, publicizing it is instead likely to bring him harm. The 
implication is that besides benefiting society, an adequate yi or yan must meet a publicity 
condition and, most likely, a universalizability condition. Yi or yan can be justified only if 
they can be publicized and regularly followed by all without negative or self-defeating 
consequences. These conditions probably also follow from the idea that an effective action-
guiding yan should be made “constant” (chang), or widely and regularly promulgated, 
combined with the Mohists’ expectation that people normally act on the yan they promulgate 
and endorse. The import of Mozi’s refutation of Wuma is that the latter’s slogan, and thus his 
yi, cannot consistently and effectively be made “constant” (chang).  
The dialogue with Wu Lü 吳慮, the opponent who criticizes Mozi’s activism, 
presents a justification for the Mohists’ devotion to promulgating their ethical and political 
yan (49: 113/13–29). Wu is a rural recluse who spends the winter making pottery and the 
summer farming. He compares himself to the sage-king Shun 舜, also traditionally said to 
have worked in the fields. Probably, then, he takes his eremitic way of life to be the sagely 
dao, and he apparently takes the Mohists’ activism to be misguided. Challenging Mozi, Wu 
claims that one should simply do what is yi (morally right), without promulgating yan 
(statements) about it: 
義耳義耳，焉用言之哉？ 
Be yi, that’s all; be yi, that’s all. What’s the use of making yan about it? (49: 113/14) 
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However, at Mozi’s prompting, Wu assents to the consequentialist view that what is yi yields 
material benefit for others. So Mozi responds by defending moral activism on the grounds 
that — in the prevailing circumstances, at least — for him, Mozi, to research and promulgate 
the dao and yan (statements) of the sage-kings ultimately benefits the world more than 
directly producing food or clothing. As a single, individual worker, his economic output 
would necessarily be limited, but promoting the dao could potentially bring about extensive 
benefit: if rulers follow his yan, they will bring order to their states, and if the common 
people follow them, they will improve their conduct. Moreover, Wu agrees as well that 
teaching or encouraging others in a worthy activity is a greater contribution than simply 
performing it oneself. Many people know little about yi (morality), Mozi claims, so why not 
disseminate yan (teachings) about it? Promulgating yan to reform people’s conduct is thus 
morally justified on the grounds of its good consequences. 
In their treatment of yan, the Mohists define a seminal position on what became one 
of the core issues of early Chinese philosophy: the role of explicitly formulated models or 
guidelines in directing action. Adopting a stance later shared by Xunzi, Han Fei, and others, 
they contend that the most effective way to promulgate the dao and lead people to follow it is 
to set forth explicit guidelines articulated through yan. This is the mainstream stance that 
parts of the Daodejing 道德經, Mencius 孟子, and Zhuangzi 莊子 reject in various ways.20 
Each of these texts expresses a skeptical stance concerning whether explicit models or yan 
can guide action effectively and, in the case of the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, about whether 
such yan should be actively disseminated. 
                                                
20 For instance, Daodejing chapter 2 describes the sage as practicing an “unstated” (bu yan 
不言) teaching, Mencius privileges the heart over yan in guiding action (2A:2), and the 
Zhuangzi advocates “fasting the heart” (xin zhai 心齋) rather than directing action by 
explicit guidelines (Zhuangzi 1956, 4/1–34). 
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Moral Worth 
The Dialogues also include several interesting passages addressing moral worth, an 
issue not explicitly treated in the Triads. These texts are significant because they tie moral 
worth to action-guiding attitudes such as intentions and commitments and to robust, stable 
aspects of agents’ character. The Dialogues thus provide strong evidence against the view 
that Mohist ethics concerns only outward compliance with the dao and neglects issues of 
character, motivation, and moral worth.21 
According to the Dialogues, the moral worth of agents’ actions and character rests on 
their yi 意 (intentions, aims) or zhi 志 (intents, commitments).22 To evaluate people’s 
character, we must determine their intent by observing the results of their conduct over the 
long term. Observation of only limited or restricted instances is not enough, for others could 
be merely luring us into trusting them.  
魯君謂子墨子曰：「我有二子，一人者好學，一人者好分人財，孰以為太子而
可？」子墨子曰：「未可知也。或所為賞與為是也。魡者之恭，非為魚賜也，
餌鼠以蟲，非愛之也。吾願主君之合其志功而觀焉。」 
The lord of Lu said to our master Mozi, “I have two sons. One of them is keen on 
study; one of them is keen on sharing wealth with others. Which would be acceptable 
as the crown prince?” Our master Mozi said, “We can’t yet know. Perhaps they act 
this way for the sake of reward or praise. The bowing motion of a fisherman, it’s not 
done for the sake of expressing gratitude to the fish; baiting rats with worms, it’s not 
done out of care for the rats. I hope your lordship will observe them to see how their 
intents match up with their results.” (49: 113/6–8) 
Short-term observation cannot yield reliable knowledge of people’s motives. Virtues such as 
                                                
21 For examples of such interpretive views, see Wong (2002, 454) and Schwartz (1985, 147). 
22 The concepts of yi 意 (intentions, aims) and zhi 志 (intents, commitments) largely 
overlap. Zhi may tend to refer to relatively long-term commitments. However, as illustrated 
below in the dialogue about feeding versus extinguishing a fire (46: 100/20–23), yi can refer 
to either the intention to perform a particular act (such as extinguishing a fire) or a long-term 
commitment (such as benefiting the world).  
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ren 仁 (moral goodness) comprise stable traits and associated patterns of conduct. Acting 
properly in a few cases does not qualify one as ren, just as temporarily standing on tiptoe 
does not make one tall. 
二三子復於子墨子曰：「告子勝為仁。」子墨子曰：「未必然也。告子為仁，
譬猶跂以為長，隱以為廣，不可久也。」 
Several disciples reported to our master Mozi, saying, “Gaozi excels in ren.” Our 
master Mozi said, “It’s not necessarily so. Gaozi’s being ren is analogous to standing 
on tiptoe to make oneself taller or spreading one’s shoulders to make oneself broader. 
It cannot last long.” (48: 111/10–11) 
These examples concern long-term evaluation of motives or character. But the texts extend 
this view to cover individual actions as well. Moral worth lies in intending to do what is yi 
(right), even if the good consequences of one’s conduct have yet to materialize.  
巫馬子謂子墨子曰：「子兼愛天下，未云利也，我不愛天下，未云賊也。功皆
未至，子何獨自是而非我哉？」子墨子曰：「今有燎者於此，一人奉水將灌
之，一人摻火將益之，功皆未至，子何貴於二人？」巫馬子曰：「我是彼奉水
者之意，而非夫摻火者之意。」子墨子曰：「吾亦是吾意，而非子之意也。」 
Wumazi said to our master Mozi, “You inclusively care for everyone in the world, but 
have yet to benefit them; I do not care about everyone, but have yet to injure them. 
Both sides having yet to achieve results, why do you deem yourself alone right and 
me wrong?” Our master Mozi said, “Suppose something is burning. One person is 
carrying water to pour on it, one person is holding fuel to add to the fire. Both sides 
having yet to achieve results, which of the two people do you value more?” Wumazi 
said, “I deem the intention of the one carrying water right and the intention of the one 
holding fire wrong.” Our master Mozi said, “I likewise deem my intention right and 
yours wrong.” (46: 100/20–23) 
One aspect of moral worth is to pursue moral ideals regardless of the prospect of reward or 
punishment: 
巫馬子謂子墨子曰：「子之為義也，人不見而助，鬼不見而富，而子為之，有
狂疾。」子墨子曰：「今使子有二臣於此，其一人者見子從事，不見子則不從
事；其一人者見子從事，不見子亦從事，子誰貴於此二人？」巫馬子曰：「我
貴其見我從事，不見我亦從事者。」子墨子曰：「然則是子亦貴有狂疾者。」 
Wumazi said to our master Mozi, “As to your practicing yi (what’s morally right), 
people do not see and assist you, the ghosts do not see and reward you, yet you do it. 
You’re crazy.” Our master Mozi said, “Suppose you have two servants. One of them 
works when he sees you and doesn’t work if he doesn’t see you. One of them works 
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whether he sees you or not. Which of the two do you value more?” Wumazi said, “I 
value the one who works whether he sees me or not.” Our master Mozi said, “So then 
you too value craziness.” (46: 100/30–101/3/) 
Another aspect is that the virtuous agent takes the initiative to pursue what is right. This is a 
point on which the Mohists contrast their dao with that of the Ru. In one passage, Gong 
Mengzi cites a Ruist saying to the effect that a gentleman offers counsel only when asked: 
公孟子謂子墨子曰：「君子共己以待，問焉則言，不問焉則止，譬若鐘然，扣
則鳴，不扣則不鳴。」 
Gong Mengzi said to our master Mozi, “The gentleman folds his hands on his chest 
and waits. When asked, he speaks; when not asked, he ceases. He is like a bell. When 
struck, it chimes; when not struck, it does not chime.” (48: 106/25–26) 
Mozi responds that this maxim applies only to predicaments in which a violent ruler is 
unlikely to heed counsel. In other cases, as when the state is endangered or the ruler is 
contemplating harmful military action, the gentleman should step forward with advice: 
“Though not struck, one must chime” (48: 106/31). Elsewhere, the Dialogues reiterate this 
point with respect to the virtue of loyalty (zhong 忠). A loyal minister is proactive in serving 
his ruler’s interests:  
魯陽文君謂子墨子曰：「有語我以忠臣者，令之俯則俯，令之仰則仰，處則
靜，呼則應，可謂忠臣乎？」子墨子曰：「令之俯則俯，令之仰則仰，是似景
也。處則靜，呼則應，是似響也。君將何得於景與響哉？若以翟之所謂忠臣
者，上有過，則微之以諫，己有善，則訪之上，而無敢以告。外匡其邪，而入
其善，尚同而無下比，是以美善在上，而怨讎在下，安樂在上，而憂慼在臣，
此翟之所謂忠臣者也。」 
Lord Wen of Luyang said to our master Mozi, “Someone explained to me his view of 
a loyal minister: If you command him to bow, he bows; if you command him to bend 
backward, he bends backward. If standing by, he is quiet; if called, he responds. Can 
this be called a loyal minister?” Our master Mozi said, “If you command him to bow, 
he bows; if you command him to bend backward, he bends backward — this 
resembles a shadow. If standing by, he is quiet; if called, he responds — this 
resembles an echo. Of what use are a shadow and echo to you? As to what I call a 
loyal minister, when his superior is at fault, he observes and warns. When he has a 
good idea, he advises his superior without announcing it to others. Outside, he 
corrects his own flaws, while he brings his good points inside. He identifies with his 
superior and does not ally with other subordinates. Thus the excellent and good are 
attributed to the superior, and complaints and grudges go to the subordinates. The 
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superior is at ease and happy, while the ministers handle the worries and troubles. 
This is what I call a loyal minister.” (49: 112/30–113/3) 
Though morally worthy agents take the initiative in pursuing the good, not everyone 
need contribute to yi (morality) in the same way. There may be a division of labor on the 
basis of people’s different abilities: 
「為義孰為大務？」子墨子曰：「譬若築牆然，能築者築，能實壤者實壤，能
欣者欣，然後牆成也。為義猶是也。能談辯者談辯，能說書者說書，能從事者
從事，然後義事成也。」 
“In practicing yi (moral rightness), what is the greatest task?” Our master Mozi said, 
“It is like building an [earthen] wall. Those who can build it up, build it up; those who 
can refill the earth, refill the earth; those who can measure, measure; and eventually 
the wall is completed. Practicing yi is like this. Those who can discuss and argue, 
discuss and argue; those who can explain texts, explain texts; those who can work, 
work; and eventually the work of yi is completed.” (46: 100/16–18) 
Although the Triads treat issues pertaining to moral worth less directly, I suggest that 
they too devote attention to agents’ motivation and character, rather than merely their 
conduct. The Triads are concerned not only with modifying what people say and do, but with 
developing the evaluative, action-guiding shi-fei attitudes that motivate proper statements 
(yan) and conduct (xing). According to the Mohist theory of “identifying upward” (shangtong 
尚同), for instance, people are to emulate virtuous political superiors in order to acquire 
evaluative attitudes that conform to unified norms for distinguishing shi (right) from fei 
(wrong). Villagers, for example, are instructed to model themselves on the virtuous official 
who governs their district: 
凡里之萬民，皆尚同乎鄉長。…鄉長之所是，必亦是之，鄉長之所非，必亦非
之。去而不善言，學鄉長之善言，去而不善行，學鄉長之善行。 
The myriad people of the village will all identify upward with the district head. . . . 
What the district head deems shi, you must also deem shi; what the district head 
deems fei, you must also deem fei. Eliminate your bad yan (statements) and learn the 
good yan of the district head; eliminate your bad conduct (xing) and learn the good 
conduct of the district head. (12: 18/9–10) 
Agents who have learned to distinguish shi from fei properly exercise their moral 
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know-how (zhi 知) by reliably doing what is yi (moral) and refraining from what is not. 
Failing to distinguish shi from fei properly yields grounds for concluding that they do not 
really “know the difference” between shi and fei (17: 31/1–4). The Mohists seem to assume 
that to have appropriate shi-fei attitudes is to have the right sort of motives, and to possess 
reliable moral know-how is to have a virtuous character. The aim is for people to acquire the 
relevant shi-fei distinctions and normative responses so that they acquire a stable, reliable 
disposition to respond properly to morally pertinent situations.23 This aim dovetails with the 
Dialogues’ position that agents’ moral worth is to be evaluated on the basis of their attitudes 
and conduct over the long term and that temporary or strained adherence to moral norms does 
not qualify as virtue. 
Moral Psychology 
A third area of development in the Dialogues is moral psychology. Several essays in the 
Triads touch on issues in this area, especially when describing people’s conduct in a state of 
nature or how people can be motivated to practice the Mohist norm of inclusive care (jian ai 
兼愛). Among the major claims the different essays advance are that even in a political state 
of nature people generally are spontaneously motivated to act on what they deem shi 是 
(right, correct) or yi (morally right) (11: 16/10); that they tend to reciprocate beneficial or 
detrimental attitudes and conduct (15: 26/10–12; 16: 16:29/23–24); that they are inclined to 
follow political leaders (15: 25/22–26/9; 16: 29/25–30/4), though they may resist if the latter 
are not perceived as acting in the public interest (12: 20/2–3); and that they are motivated by 
community approval and discouraged by disapproval (12: 20/5–8).24 On the whole, however, 
the Triads devote relatively little direct attention to moral psychology, since their major focus 
                                                
23 I discuss these points in more detail in Fraser (2011). 
24 For further discussion of these points, see Fraser (2008) and (2011). 
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is normative doctrines and policy proposals. The Dialogues flesh out the Mohists’ views on 
moral psychology and develop their positions on several points. 
The Dialogues’ core psychological generalization resonates with the account of 
people in a state of nature presented in the Triad essays on “Identifying Upward.” Both these 
essays and the Dialogues hold that people tend to be strongly committed to yi (morality) and 
will generally act on their conception of it. According to “Identifying Upward I,” for 
instance, prior to the establishment of government and universal moral education, people all 
“deemed their [conception of] yi (morality) right, on that basis deemed others’ yi wrong, and 
so deemed each other wrong 是以人是其義以非人之義，故交相非也” (11: 16/10–11). 
The motivational force of these convictions is so strong that they lead to violent social 
turmoil. The Dialogues reiterate the idea that people are generally motivated by their 
conception of yi, at least when its demands are not too strenuous. Anyone would help 
someone struggling with a heavy load, for instance, because doing so is yi (morally right): 
今有人於此，負粟息於路側，欲起而不能，君子見之，無長少貴賤，必起之。
何故也？曰：義也。 
Suppose there is a man carrying grain who is resting by the roadside. He wants to get 
up but cannot. On seeing him, whether old or young, of high rank or low, gentlemen 
would surely help him up. Why? I say, because it is yi.25 (47: 106/4–5) 
Indeed, people value yi even more than life. They would never sacrifice a limb for a piece of 
clothing, nor their life to rule the world, but they will fight to the death over yan (statements, 
                                                
25 Passages such as this one refute skepticism about whether the Mohists ascribe to people 
any sort of morally worthy motivation. Nivison (1996, 83) and Ivanhoe (1998, sect. 4), for 
instance, seem to think that for the Mohists there is no such thing as virtuous motivation. 
Contemporary New Confucian writers have expressed similar views (Cai 1978, 83). 
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doctrines) that they think violate yi.26 
子墨子曰：「萬事莫貴於義。今謂人曰：予子冠履，而斷子之手足，子為之
乎？必不為，何故？則冠履不若手足之貴也。又曰：予子天下而殺子之身，子
為之乎？必不為，何故？則天下不若身之貴也。爭一言以相殺，是貴義於其身
也。故曰：萬事莫貴於義也。」 
Our master Mozi said, “Nothing is more valuable than yi. Suppose we said to 
someone, ‘I’ll give you a hat and shoes but cut off your hands and feet, will you do 
it?’ Surely he wouldn’t do it. Why? It’s that a hat and shoes are not as valuable as 
hands and feet. And suppose we said, ‘I’ll give you the empire but take your life, will 
you do it?’ Surely he wouldn’t do it. Why? It’s that the empire is not as valuable as 
one’s life. Yet people will kill each other fighting over a single yan. This is valuing yi 
more than one’s life. So I say, nothing is more valuable than yi.” (47: 103/23–26) 
Moreover, people like to think of themselves as yi: they are pleased to be praised for it even 
when the praise is unmerited and they see themselves as needing no help to achieve it. 
子墨子曰：「世俗之君子，貧而謂之富則怒，無義而謂之有義則喜，豈不悖
哉！」 
Our master Mozi said, “The gentlemen of the age, if they are poor and you say they 
are rich, they are angry, but if they are immoral and you say they are moral (yi), they 
are pleased. Isn’t it perverse!” (46: 102/11) 
子墨子曰：「世之君子，欲其義之成，而助之修其身則慍，是猶欲其牆之成，
而人助之築則慍也，豈不悖哉！」 
Our master Mozi said, “The gentlemen of the world want to become moral, but if you 
help them cultivate themselves, they resent it. This is like wanting to build a wall, but 
if people help you build, resenting it. Isn’t it perverse!” (47: 105/13–14) 
These passages are two of many in the Dialogues that criticize “the gentlemen of the age” for 
failing to understand and pursue correct moral norms — often while paying lip service to 
morality — and even opposing the Mohists’ moral activism. On the one hand, anyone would 
help the man carrying grain to lift his load, because it is the right thing to do. But on the other 
                                                
26 This statement is comparable to Mencius’s claim that people will generally give priority to 
yi, even when doing so conflicts with the only available means of preserving their life. Even a 
beggar, Mencius suggests, would not accept food given with a deliberate show of disrespect 
(Lau 1970, 6A:10). 
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hand: 
今為義之君子，奉承先王之道以語之，縱不說而行，又從而非毀之。則是世俗
之君子之視義士也，不若視負粟者也。」 
Now gentlemen who practice yi (morality) carry on the dao of the former kings and 
expound it, but not only are [the gentlemen of the age] not pleased to practice it, they 
even condemn and slander it. This is the gentlemen of the age holding the moral 
person in less regard than a carrier of grain. (47: 106/5–7) 
Although people tend to be motivated by their conception of yi, their grasp of yi is often 
inadequate, and so society falls short of Mohist moral ideals. The Dialogues are optimistic 
about people’s commitment to the general idea of yi, but they also express deep frustration 
with — and even alienation from — the actual moral attitudes of many “gentlemen of the 
age” (世俗之君子, 47: 106/4). Given society’s low moral standards, proper moral, social, 
and political order can be achieved only through active dissemination of correct moral 
doctrines — a stance which converges with that of the Triads.  
According to the Dialogues, people are inclined not only to act on what they take to 
be yi, but to respond positively to others who practice yi. If treated with care and respect, 
people feel close to and identify with others; without care and respect, they can easily 
become estranged. In one story, the famous inventor Gongshuzi 公輸子 challenges Mozi to 
explain whether his yi (moral norms) has “hooks and rams” analogous to those Gongshu 
developed for naval warfare, which can stop the retreat or block the advance of enemy boats. 
Mozi replies: 
我義之鉤強，賢於子舟戰之鉤強，我鉤之以愛，揣之以恭。弗鉤以愛則不親，
弗揣以恭則速狎，狎而不親，則速離。故交相愛交相恭，猶若相利也。今子鉤
而止人，人亦鉤而止子，子強而距人，人亦強而距子，交相鉤交相強，猶若相
害也。故我義之鉤強，賢子舟戰之鉤強。 
The hooks and rams of my yi are superior to yours for naval battles. I hook people 
with care and push them with respect. If you do not hook them with care, they will not 
be close to you; if you do not push them with respect, they will quickly become 
contemptuous. If they are contemptuous and not close to you, they will quickly leave 
you. So caring about and respecting each other amounts to benefiting each other. Now 
23 
if you forcibly hook people to stop them, they too will hook and stop you; if you 
forcibly ram them to repel them, they too will ram and repel you. Hooking and 
ramming each other amounts to harming each other. So the hooks and rams of my yi 
are superior to yours for naval battles. (49: 115/15–19) 
This passage echoes two important psychological generalizations found in the Triads. One is 
that people generally reciprocate each other’s attitudes and conduct (15: 25/24–25, 16: 
29/23–24), a tendency that for the Mohists helps explain why the norm of all-inclusive care 
for everyone (jian ai 兼愛) is practically feasible. The other is that people — specifically, 
competent officials — will not feel “close” (qin 親) to, and will hesitate to serve, a leader 
who fails to show them appropriate care and esteem — specifically, by paying them well and 
delegating genuine responsibility to them (9: 11/13–16). A significant feature of this passage 
is that it introduces an explicit concept of respect (gong 恭) for others, a notion absent from 
the Triads.27 In their emphasis on the comparatively proactive moral attitude of care (ai 愛), 
which involves a positive inclination to benefit others, the Triads tend to overlook the more 
neutral moral attitude of respect, which — for contemporary moral philosophers, at least — 
might involve only an inclination to treat others fairly and avoid harming them. Having 
introduced the notion of respect, however, the Dialogues do not go on to develop a distinctive 
theoretical role for it.28 
                                                
27 A passage in one of the “Promoting the Worthy” essays states that to recruit talented 
personnel for employment in government, one should show them reverence (jing 敬) (8: 
9/16). But none of the Triad essays mention respect for others as a core moral attitude on a 
par with care (ai 愛) for others.  
28 This point is unsurprising, given the Mohists’ tendency (discussed below) to emphasize 
increasingly stringent moral standards. Moral norms that emphasize respect for all are 
typically less demanding than those that seek to promote everyone’s welfare, as the Mohist 
dao does.  
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“Valuing Yi” 貴義, the second book of the Dialogues, contains a series of remarks 
providing advice on personal moral discipline, a topic that receives little attention in the 
Triads.29 A likely explanation for its inclusion here is that the Dialogues may have been 
directed primarily at Mohist followers, rather than the broader audience addressed by the 
Triads, many of which explicitly appeal to the entire hierarchy of government officials, along 
with other “gentlemen of the world.” Where the Triads resemble a series of public advocacy 
pamphlets, the Dialogues may be more comparable to a handbook for Mohist adherents, 
which treats the concrete practice of the Mohist dao. Among other points, the Dialogues urge 
their audience to engage only in speech and actions that benefit all (47: 104/15–17); to repeat 
or “make constant” yan (statements) that improve conduct while refraining from those that do 
not (47: 104/19–20); and to persevere in the path of yi even if they fail occasionally (47: 
104/22–23). 
This last remark is of particular interest, for it suggests an intriguing approach to 
weakness of the will that coheres with, but is not articulated in, doctrines presented in the 
Triads. As I mentioned above, the Mohists consider the ability to draw and act on shi-fei 
distinctions properly a form of competence or know-how (zhi 知), akin in some respects to 
the ability to perform a skill. Accordingly, their primary explanation for an agent’s failure to 
act morally is that the agent lacks the relevant know-how. As they understand it, such failure 
is typically due not to insufficient motivation, but to ignorance or incompetence in 
distinguishing shi from fei and responding accordingly. Mohist texts depict three overlapping 
                                                
29 Two illustrations of such personal moral discipline that we do find in the Triads are the 
gentleman and the ruler depicted practicing inclusive care in the arguments intended to show 
that inclusive care is practically “applicable” (16: 27/28–28/10). Both guide their conduct by 
reciting to themselves statements (yan) about how an exemplary gentleman or ruler is as 
committed to the good of his friends or subjects as to his own. 
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types of cases of such ignorance or incompetence. The first occurs when the agent simply 
does not know how to distinguish shi from fei properly, as when people fail to distinguish 
wars of aggression as fei (wrong) and even deem them yi (morally right) (17: 30/27–30/3, 28: 
49/7–8). The texts especially call attention to cases of partial incompetence, in which people 
distinguish shi from fei properly in some but not all relevant instances. One example is when 
they rightly condemn theft and murder but wrongly approve of unprovoked warfare aimed at 
seizing the wealth and slaughtering the populace of other states. 
子墨子謂魯陽文君曰：「世俗之君子，皆知小物而不知大物。今有人於此，竊
一犬一彘，則謂之不仁，竊一國一都，則以為義。譬猶小視白謂之白，大視白
則謂之黑。」 
Our master Mozi said to Lord Wen of Luyang, “The gentlemen of the age all know 
minor things but not major ones. Suppose there is a man here. If he steals a dog or 
pig, they call him morally bad (not ren). If he steals a state or a city, they take him to 
be yi (morally right). It’s like seeing a small amount of white and calling it white, yet 
seeing a large amount of white and calling it black.” (49: 112/20–22) 
Another is when they apply a norm such as “employing the capable” properly in some cases, 
as when hiring a professional bowyer to repair a bow or veterinarian to cure a sick horse, but 
not others, as when they appoint an inexperienced relative to an official post (10: 14/6–16).30 
Such cases represent a failure fully “to know (zhi) the distinction between right (yi) and not-
right” (17: 31/3). 
The second type of case is when the agent verbally draws distinctions correctly but 
then fails to act properly. An agent may mouth the right words about morality, yet lack the 
practical know-how to reliably distinguish and choose what is right and reject what is wrong 
(19: 33/15–17). These are cases in which agents’ conduct (xing) fails to conform to their 
statements (yan). 
子墨子曰：「今瞽曰：鉅者白也，黔者黑也。雖明目者無以易之。兼白黑，使
瞽者取焉，不能知也。故我曰瞽不知白黑者，非以其名也，以其取也。今天下
                                                
30 See note 15 above. 
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之君子之名仁也，雖禹湯無以易之。兼仁與不仁，而使天下之君子取焉，不能
知也。故我曰天下之君子不知仁者，非以其名也，亦以其取也。」 
Our master Mozi said, “Now the blind say, ‘What’s bright is white, and what’s dark is 
black.’ Even the clear-sighted have no basis for changing this claim. But combine 
white and black things together and make a blind man select among them, and he 
cannot know them. So as to my saying the blind do not know white and black, it’s not 
on the basis of their naming, it’s on the basis of their selecting. Now as to how the 
gentlemen of the world name ren (moral goodness), even [the sage-kings] Yu and 
Tang have no basis for changing it. But combine ren and not-ren things together and 
make the gentlemen of the world select among them, and they cannot know them. So 
as to my saying the gentlemen of the world do not know ren, it’s not on the basis of 
their naming, it’s on the basis of their selecting.” (47: 105/4–7) 
To count as having moral know-how, the agent must respond to shi-fei distinctions not just 
by making the appropriate sort of statements, but by reliably performing appropriate actions. 
A third type of incompetence is when an agent endorses the dao and undertakes to act 
on it, yet fails to do so. The agent commits to the dao, and presumably has some grasp of the 
distinctions and responses it entails, but falters in carrying it out, perhaps because of doubt or 
confusion about what to do, a lack of self-confidence, or motivational inertia. In the Mohist 
theoretical scheme, this sort of failure to follow a dao one endorses is comparable to akrasia, 
or weakness of will, since it amounts to a failure to do what one intends or deems best. 
However, rather than framing the problem as a failure to act on one’s best judgment or to 
carry out one’s intention to perform some discrete act, the Mohists view it as a lack of ability 
or competence in carrying out a dao one has embarked on. The Triads do not treat this issue 
explicitly, but a passage from the Dialogues addresses it as follows: 
為義而不能，必無排其道。譬若匠人之斲而不能，無排其繩。 
If you undertake to practice yi (morality) but are not able, you must not abandon the 
dao. To give an analogy, a carpenter who saws [a straight edge] but is not able does 
not abandon the marking line. (47: 104/28) 
The emphasis on ability (neng 能), paired with the carpentry analogy, suggests that — as in 
the second type of case above, when people say the right things but then fail to act properly 
— the Mohists ascribe this sort of akratic failure to a form of incompetence, not insufficient 
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motivation.31 This incompetence is analogous to a defect in performing a skill, such as 
sawing a straight edge. So they probably see the remedy for akratic failure as analogous to 
that for ineptitude in a skill: the agent should continue training himself to recognize and act 
on evaluative distinctions properly, with the dao as his guide, until he can do so reliably — 
just as the novice carpenter should keep practicing his sawing technique, with the marking 
line as his guide, until he masters his craft. For the carpenter, the eventual outcome is skill 
mastery; for the moral agent, it is virtue.32 
Sagehood Ideal 
The fourth development in the Dialogues is an explicit ideal of personal moral 
sagehood not found in the Triads. On the whole, the Dialogues present a more demanding 
view of the moral life than the Triads do. The main requirement the Triads place on the 
typical member of society is to conform to the norms of yi (moral rightness), which, if 
generally followed, would promote the benefit of all. These norms comprise inclusive care; 
                                                
31 This interpretation is consistent with passages in the Triads that discuss whether the 
Mohist norm of inclusive care is too difficult. According to “Inclusive Care” I and II, the 
major obstacles to the widespread practice of inclusive care are “just that rulers do not adopt 
it as a basis for government and officers do not adopt it as a basis for conduct” (特君不以為
政而士不以為行故也, 15: 26/12) and that “no rulers delight in it” (無有上說之者, 16: 30/4). 
Both texts claim that people can be brought to practice inclusive care through their 
inclination to conform to their ruler’s wishes. The key problem is not that it is difficult, but 
that rulers have not promulgated it as their society’s dao and accordingly people have not 
adopted it as a norm. Of course, the ruler’s approval, along with any rewards and 
punishments he institutes, will contribute to people’s motivation to practice it. But the chief 
reason they fail to practice it is not a lack of motivation; it is that the ruler has not established 
it as a norm, and so people have not acquired the relevant competence. For a detailed 
discussion of Mohist views on motivation, see Fraser (2008) and (2011). 
32 This sketch rebuts Nivison’s claim that the Mohists have no explanation of akrasia beyond 
“sheer perversity” on the agent’s part (1996, 84). 
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refraining from war, theft, oppression, and exploitation; sharing surplus labor, knowledge, 
and surplus resources; performing one’s social role conscientiously, thus contributing to 
social order and economic prosperity; helping to provide for orphans and the childless 
elderly; and exercising the relational virtues of kindness toward subordinates, loyalty toward 
superiors, compassion toward one’s children, filial devotion toward one’s parents, and 
fraternal love toward siblings.33 By today’s standards, all this adds up roughly to being a 
caring and considerate family member, a responsible member of society, and a decent 
neighbor willing to offer others a helping hand. Being yi (moral) lies largely in playing one’s 
part in a system that promotes the benefit of all.34 
The Dialogues, by contrast, suggest that yi lies largely in helping others, as Mozi 
seems to imply when he asks Wu Lü whether what he calls yi is, as for Mozi, a matter of 
“having strength to work for others and wealth to share with others” (有力以勞人，有財以
分人) (49: 113/14–15).35 Moreover, if yi does not prevail in the world, one can only work 
                                                
33 For particularly clear examples, see Mozi (26: 43/7–8, 26: 43/25–27, 27: 44/26–45/2, and 
28: 48/23–28).  
34 Besides the minimal requirement of yi (moral rightness), the Triads also present a more 
stringent ideal of ren 仁 (moral goodness). The mark of ren people is that they “take as their 
business promoting the benefit of the world and eliminating harm to the world” (15: 24/26–
27), an end potentially much more demanding than the basic norms of yi. But ren may simply 
have been a virtuous attitude, rather than a standard of conduct, and the Triads do not suggest 
that people are generally expected to go beyond the demands of yi and dedicate themselves to 
directly pursuing the benefit of all. A person who lives up to the requirements of yi, without 
directly seeking to promote the benefit of the world, is not blameworthy. (I discuss the ideal 
of ren further below.) 
35 Precursors of this characterization of yi can be found in several Triad essays. According to 
one passage, Heaven desires that “people who have strength work for each other, who have 
dao teach each other, and who have wealth share with each other” (27: 44/28). This ideal 
echoes the description of social disorder in the first two “Identifying Upward” essays, which 
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even harder to achieve it, whether or not others do their share. 
子墨子自魯之齊，即過故人，謂子墨子曰：「今天下莫為義，子獨自苦而為
義，子不若已。」子墨子曰：「今有人於此，有子十人，一人耕而九人處，則
耕者不可以不益急矣。何故？則食者眾而耕者寡也。今天下莫為義，則子如勸
我者也，何故止我？」 
Traveling from Lu to Qi, our master Mozi passed an old acquaintance, who said to 
him, “Now no one in the world practices yi. You alone toil to practice yi. You’d be 
better off quitting.” Our master Mozi said, “Suppose there were a man with ten sons. 
One worked the fields while nine sat around. Then the one who worked the fields 
could not but work even more urgently. Why? Those who eat are many, while those 
who work are few. Now if no one in the world practices yi, you should encourage me. 
Why stop me?” (47: 103/28–104/1) 
Here we find hints of the self-sacrificing extremism that, according to the Zhuangzi “Under 
Heaven” essay (1956, 33/27ff.), became prevalent among some Mohist factions late in the 
movement’s history. In this respect, the Dialogues may reflect a general tendency as Mohism 
developed to shift toward more demanding norms of conduct,36 eventually culminating in the 
legendary selflessness of late Warring States Mohist militias.37 
Among the remarks on personal moral discipline in the Dialogues is a striking 
passage that advocates eliminating the influence of emotions and other potential sources of 
bias and dedicating oneself wholly to yi, so as to become a sage or moral saint.  
子墨子曰：嘿則思，言則誨，動則事，使三者代御，必為聖人。必去六辟，必
去喜，去怒，去樂，去悲，去愛而用仁義。手足口鼻耳，從事於義，必為聖
                                                                                                                                                  
claim that as order breaks down, people cease to share surplus labor, surplus wealth, and 
“good dao” (11: 16/12–13, 12: 17/18; see too 10: 15/16–17). By implication, when society 
conforms to yi, people are expected to share surplus labor and wealth. Two key differences 
from the Dialogues are the qualifiers “each other” and “surplus.” The sharing is depicted as 
reciprocal, rather than purely altruistic, and in the “Identifying Upward” essays it is 
specifically surplus labor and goods that are shared, not all labor and goods.  
36 Later versions of the doctrine of inclusive care (jian ai 兼愛), for instance, seem more 
demanding than earlier ones (see Defoort in this volume). 
37 The dedication and heroism of these bands of Mohists are vividly depicted in the Annals of 
Lü Buwei and the Huainanzi. See Knoblock and Riegel (2000, 487–88) and He (1998, 1406).  
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人。 
Our master Mozi said, “When silent, ponder; when speaking, instruct; when acting, 
work. Make these three alternate one after the other and you will surely be a sage. 
You must remove the six biases: you must remove happiness and anger, joy and 
sorrow, fondness [and dislike] and apply ren and yi. Your hands, feet, mouth, nose, 
and ears being employed for yi, you will surely be a sage. (47: 104/22–26) 
The “six biases” are affective attitudes or passions — happiness, anger, joy, sorrow, 
preferences, and aversions. The text takes these as unreliable grounds for guiding action and 
urges us to reject them in favor of guidance by ren (moral goodness) and yi (moral rightness). 
This passage has been cited as evidence that the Mohists advocate guiding action by 
“dispassionate intellect” instead of “unreasoned attachment” (Wong 2002, 453). I suggest, 
however, that such a reading imports a Western concern with the contrast between reason and 
passion that is alien to the Mozi. The Mohists themselves draw no clear distinction between 
intellect and emotion,38 nor do they employ any concept that corresponds directly to that of 
reason. The text mentions only applying ren and yi, not “dispassionate intellect,” and its 
argument is that the other attitudes are prone to bias, not that they are “unreasoned.” Nor, I 
think, does the passage entail that we should become wholly dispassionate or emotionless. 
Ren and the relational virtues of hui 惠 (benevolence), zhong 忠 (faithfulness), ci 慈 
(compassion), xiao 孝 (filial devotion), and ti 悌 (brotherliness) — which many of the 
Triad essays count among the goods that constitute yi (morality) — are likely to include 
affective components, though these may be calmer or less intense than happiness, anger, joy, 
and sorrow. The text’s point is rather that conduct should be guided by the virtue of ren and 
the objective, impartial norms of yi, rather than by easily biased emotions and preferences.39 
                                                
38 I argue for this point in Fraser (2011). 
39 The passage thus presents an interesting contrast with Mencius, who holds that some 
emotions, such as our alarm at seeing an infant in danger, naturally align with correct moral 
norms and morally worthy motivation, and that personal moral development lies in extending 
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The Mohist stance on the passions here is defensible, insofar as the six attitudes the 
text mentions are indeed highly susceptible to bias. Even when they do align with correct 
moral judgment, they alone cannot properly be the basis for conduct, but must be checked 
against moral norms. Still, the passage invites several lines of criticism. One could argue that 
the passions are part of human life and, in some cases at least, are a modality through which 
we more fully appreciate the moral status of certain events or situations. (The torture of 
innocent children, for instance, is not merely wrong, but horrendous.) The passage proposes 
that the path to moral sagehood lies in setting aside our personal, potentially biased passions 
and acting on ren and yi alone. An important alternative view, one sometimes associated with 
Ruism, is that sagehood might lie instead in integrating the passions with ren, so as to bring 
them into line with correct moral judgments. Instead of ignoring joy and sorrow, for instance, 
we would seek to feel joyful about things that are morally good or right and sorrowful about 
those that are bad or wrong. One might argue that this latter view more adequately recognizes 
the place of emotions in moral life. In the Mohists’ defense, however, the passage is not 
describing the psychology of the sage or the ren person, but advocating an approach to 
personal moral development. The Mohists might agree that the sagely person feels joy about 
the good and sorrow about the bad. But this is irrelevant to the text’s claim, which is that to 
become such a person, we should set aside the bias-prone emotions and preferences we feel 
now and in their place “apply ren and yi.”  
Another question is whether the distinction between preferences and shi-fei 
distinctions grounded in our conception of yi is as sharp as the passage assumes (see Griffin 
1996, 19–36). The Mohists themselves are committed to the view that to distinguish 
                                                                                                                                                  
or filling these out appropriately. Mencius’s chief point is that such passions show we are 
“capable” (neng 能) of being morally good. He is vague about the criteria for discriminating 
morally relevant passions from irrelevant or bad ones, but two he clearly thinks especially 
important are care for parents and respect for brothers (Lau 1970, 7A:15). 
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something as shi or fei is at the same time to approve or condemn it, and thus to have a 
preference for or against it.40 Of course, the point of the passage is that we should eliminate 
subjective bias, not all preferences. But a more defensible way to make this point might be to 
advocate bringing our preferences into line with objective norms, rather than simply 
“removing” (qu 去) them. 
These quibbles aside, the most striking aspect of the passage is its ideal of total 
dedication to morality. One is to devote every thought, utterance, and action to ren and yi, 
setting everything else aside. No room is left for any activity without positive moral value, 
derived, according to Mohist normative theory, from contributing in some way to the benefit 
of all. Morality here is not merely a constraint on our conduct, a normative status our actions 
should have, or one good among others. It is an all-encompassing end in itself. The sage ideal 
presented here is thus considerably more demanding than the moral doctrines of the Triads, 
which require only that everyone live by norms whose collective practice promotes the 
benefit of all.  
To grasp the place of this passage in Mohist thought, however, I suggest that again we 
need to consider its likely audience. As I proposed above, the Dialogues may be directed at 
committed Mohist followers, who have already dedicated themselves to promoting the 
benefit of all — to becoming paradigmatic ren people who “take as their task promoting the 
benefit of the world and eliminating harm to the world” (15: 24/26–27). The passage may 
thus present a supererogatory ideal, not a basic moral norm that all are obliged to follow. 
Given the religious character of the Mohist movement, the injunction to purge the “six 
biases” and devote oneself wholly to ren and yi probably should not be compared to a general 
moral guideline, such as “Do not harm the innocent,” but to the strict norms of self-discipline 
adopted by members of an ascetic religious order. In this context, the conception of sagehood 
                                                
40 See Fraser (2011). 
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presented here is understandable, even admirable. It is easy to imagine, in a world of scarcity 
and turmoil such as the Mohists’, people choosing to organize their lives around the project 
of bringing about a morally more satisfactory state of affairs — such as by working, as the 
Mohists did, to prevent war and alleviate poverty. In the context of Mohist religious beliefs, 
this commitment to sagehood can also be regarded as a profound expression of spirituality or 
religiousness.41 For devoted Mohist believers, the sagehood ideal would have represented a 
way of more directly conforming to the intent of Heaven and thus in effect achieving a form 
of unity with the divine. Indeed, the pursuit of such moral and religious ideals may have been 
among the few constructive life choices open to many Mohists (especially if, as generally 
thought, they came largely from the lower classes of society). These ideals may have seemed 
all the more attractive and empowering because of the chance they offered to make a 
difference in the world. Given the adverse, war-ravaged economic and political 
circumstances in which Mohism arose, it is hardly surprising that some people might have 
been inspired to emulate the heroic altruism of the fabled sage-king Yu 禹, as the Zhuangzi 
reports some dedicated Mohists sought to do. 
Absent a comparable religious background or a similarly harsh historical and 
economic context, however, this ideal of sagehood is difficult to justify. Indeed, to secular, 
contemporary readers, it is bound to seem narrow and impoverished. We view moderate 
indulgence of passions or preferences as compatible with the demands of yi, and we cannot 
easily see yi filling up all of life in the way the sagehood ideal implies. Indeed, it is difficult 
to envision how yi should or even could come to dominate life in this way unless we were to 
share two things with the Mohists: a consequentialist view on which yi lies in the promotion 
of a narrowly specified set of goods, and a historical setting in which securing those goods is 
immensely difficult.  
                                                
41 I thank Roman Malek for suggesting this point. 
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Conclusion 
To sum up, the ethics of the Dialogues is in many respects consistent with the views 
in various Triad essays, but the Dialogues present at least four important extensions of 
Mohist ethical ideas. They elucidate the Mohist conception of yi 義 (morality) or the dao 道 
as norms that can be promulgated through yan 言 (statements, teachings) and “constantly” 
(chang 常) followed by all with beneficial, self-consistent consequences. They clarify an 
interesting stance on moral worth that ties it to agents’ character and intentions. They develop 
the Mohist view of moral motivation and indicate an intriguing approach to cases of action 
failure comparable to weakness of the will. They also set forth a stringent ideal of personal 
moral sagehood. On the whole, the Dialogues present a more demanding conception of the 
moral life than the Triads do. This difference may be due partly to a general tendency in later 
generations of the Mohist movement to embrace increasingly stringent ethical norms. But it 
may also be explained by the different audiences to which the two sets of texts are directed. 
Whereas most of the Triads are explicitly addressed to rulers, officials, and gentlemen, few of 
whom would have been Mohist adherents, the Dialogues appear to be addressed primarily to 
committed Mohist disciples. Indeed, they may be comparable to a handbook or commonplace 
book of teachings for adherents, as in many places they discuss the concrete practice of 
Mohist doctrines or issues that might arise in actual dialogue with opponents. Hence in places 
they may depict ideals adopted specifically by devout followers, rather than norms the 
Mohists applied to the typical member of society.42 
                                                
42 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on “The Many Faces of 
Mozi,” Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, June 25–28, 2009. I am grateful to the conference 
participants for helpful comments, especially Roman Malek (the discussant for the paper). I 
am also indebted to the editors of this volume, Carine Defoort and Nicolas Standaert, for 
many useful comments. 
